A common assumption is that regime change policies are necessary to spread democracy and advance economic interests. Indeed, the United States has used military force to promote regime change a number of times, primarily for political or economic reasons. But there is a growing scholarly consensus that such efforts are often counterproductive. They tend to fail to achieve their stated goals, generate a host of deleterious side effects, and pull intervening powers into lengthy nation-building projects.
The first problem is that regime change can do considerable harm to the people targeted by the policy, as well as other innocent civilians. It is important for policymakers to be fully aware of this potential outcome, and to weigh the cost against its benefits in making a decision about whether or when to target a government through covert non-lethal or lethal means.
Moreover, if regime change is pursued for the wrong reasons it may create conditions ripe for the rise of an even more despotic regime. For example, in Libya, the removal of Colonel Gaddafi created an environment dominated by extremists that has not yet stabilized. And in Syria, a popular uprising against the regime of Bashar al-Assad was met with intervention by Russia and other outside forces that has left over a million people dead and sowed the seeds for a jihadi takeover.
If we are going to engage in regime change, it must be because a deplorable regime is committing atrocities and there is substantial organized domestic opposition that wants it gone. And there must also be a credible alternative to assume power that can provide the necessary legitimacy and stability. Otherwise, the process risks a descent into a new cycle of conflict, bloodshed and despair.