Peace talks involve the process of resolving conflict between two or more nation-states or groups of people by means of formal negotiations. They are typically aimed at ending violent conflict, although they can also include political, economic, and social structural reforms needed to remedy past grievances and build more equitable societies.
How do governments maximize their short-term interests and promote the long-term success of peace talks? What are the key trade-offs in peace talks, and how can they be best anticipated and addressed?
The answers to these questions depend on how the negotiation framework is set. A government’s short-term interests may be better served by a nonlegalized, opaque, and exclusionary framework, but this type of framework is unlikely to achieve the goal of peace (Kaplow 2016). Negotiation-setting governments should consider the implications of their choice of framework on both sides of the bargaining table.
For example, the Colombian government legislated guidelines for identifying negotiating parties and issues at stake, publicized all partial agreements and disagreements throughout the process, and included many third-party mediators and nonbinding civil society participation. In contrast, the Turkish government allowed no visitors to Ocalan during the critical period of the peace talks and largely kept the content of the negotiations secret from the public.
Both countries also faced influential spoilers who wanted to sabotage the negotiations. In Colombia, former President Uribe built a coalition of rural landowning and ranching elites, sections of the military, and politicians to oppose the negotiations with FARC. In Turkey, ultranationalists and Gulenists criticized the negotiations and protested in support of the armed PKK, but they did not play a significant role in derailing the process.